The reader should know that the Gazette does not know with certainty if any given bid or offer on any given day has been placed by either of the MFAO market-makers, but offers the following examples believing that what he describes occurs with regularity on the olive oil futures market.
We have no idea how many readers of the Gazette actually use the olive oil futures market, the MFAO, as a business tool - but we will work on the assumption that the number rounds out to close to zero. Despite this, and assuming that one day this might change, we are giving out a free lesson in the how that market functions - or fails to, as the case may be. Today's entry will centre on the exchange market-makers.
The market-makers are commercial traders that have taken on the role of price setters. In the case of the MFAO, the market-maker on the sell side is growers' macro-cooperative, Hojiblanca, and, on the buy, bottler SOS-Cuétara. It is fairly easy to see the logic here. Hojiblanca is, by nature, a bulk seller of olive oil and SOS, a bulk buyer. Between the two, the opening bid-ask spread is posted, the latter, of course, looking to buy at a lower price than the former is willing to sell for. The agreement these two have with the exchange, and for which they are rewarded with reduced commissions on all their trades, is to open with, and attempt to maintain, a 4 cent spread on the front month contract along with a widening figure the more distant into the future the deliveries. Typically, one sees the farthest out starting the day with 8 cents of difference.
In theory, imagining a day like today in which the March 08 contract opened at 2.50€ bid and 2.54€ ask, both probably placed by the respective market-makers, other buyers and sellers would come in with bids and offers both in between and outside of these figures, and the first trade might take place at, say 2.52. But no. What does take place on a daily basis is that other interested parties line up their trades behind these first, like children hiding behind their mothers' skirts, and no business takes place until one or the other opening numbers is hit. In the case of this morning, someone went directly for the 2.54 offer and took out the 25,000 kilos in one fell swoop. Apparently, however, this party did not think this an interesting enough price to actually bid for, say, 50 contracts (or 26, even), which would have left a bid on the board that reflected the actual market. Instead, the table was left without an offer, and the bid remained at 2.50.
The reaction to this was, although not unusual, interesting. The sell side was left uncovered for a considerable length of time before soemone, possibly but not certainly Hojiblanca, came back with an offer of 2.58 - which was not immediately reacted to with a new, raised opposing bid - leaving the March contract with an 8 cent spread. Now, when the May offer of 2.58 was also nailed, the other typical response came into play - later month sell prices were removed and replaced 2 cents higher. All this happens, to be sure, on the other side when sellers are moving the market.
What's wrong with this modus operandi? First, it is placing to much onus on the market-makers who, because of their commitment to maintain minimum spreads, may not be offering or bidding what they think is a desirable price. Over the course of a year, they must not see their agreement with the MFAO as costing them money, or one day they might decide to not renew. Second, the almost total refusal of participants to negotiate inside the spread removes an important tool from the hedger's (or investor's) kit - the stop order. This, for the uninitiated, would be a buy or sell order that gets triggered at the best available bid or offer once a real trade takes place at a predetermined price. In this morning's example, a stop sell placed at 2.54 would have been converted into a market order, and executed at the best available price - in this far from extreme case, 2.50. A stop buy would have found no offer, leaving him or her at the mercy of the market maker who typically has access to that information. Keep in mind that, assuming the normal lot size of 25 contracts, each 1 cent difference is worth 250 euros. The worst case this writer has seen reached 14 cents as the market bought up everything up to 2.34, leaving 2.38 as the only offer and no one, despite the strong upward movement displayed in the session would come in ahead of the 2.24 bid that someone, possibly SOS, had opened the day with. Apparently, and understandably, the party that had placed this order had no intention of changing it in a slow, midsummer market. A stop sell for 25 contracts, in this case, would have cost its owner 2,750 euros on execution!
The two MFAO market-makers clearly get tired of assuming all the risk here and, on a regular basis, wait a considerable time before adapting to executed trades. They did, after all, not get into this to merely trade their own account, or act as brokers for frightened or too-comfortable buyers and sellers whilst hampered by a contractual restraint on the prices they are willing to pay or accept.
Behind all this, of course, is that users of the MFAO are still treating it as another cash market, rather than a hedging utility, and there are insufficient speculators to really give it any grease. But, if any of our readers are, or one day become involved, they should keep in mind that you don't win a football game standing around waiting for the ball to come to you.